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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALAN DELANEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 920815-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant §78-2a-3(2)(f) Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the stop of Appellant's vehicle a pretext stop 
requiring the suppression of evidence obtained from a subsequent 
search? 
2. Did the prearrest detention void the search? 
3. Did the Appellant give consent to search his vehicle? 
4. If Appellant gave consent to search his vehicle, was his 
consent voluntary? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV [Unreasonable 
searches and seizures] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with violating §58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) of the 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, to wit: Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, Cocaine, With the Intent to Distribute. The 
evidence was discovered during a search of Appellant's vehicle 
after having been stopped for an alleged speeding violation. 
Appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a 
result of the stop and warrantless search of his automobile upon 
the grounds that there was not a reasonable suspicion that the 
driver had committed a traffic offense or was otherwise engaged in 
criminal activity, that the detention of the Appellant following 
the stop was unreasonable and without probable cause, that the 
Appellant did not give consent to search his vehicle, and that any 
consent deemed to have been given was not done so voluntarily. A 
suppression hearing was held on November 7, 1991, before the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge of the Fourth Judicial 
District. The State put on evidence in the form of the testimony 
of Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, Paul Mangelson, in support of its 
burden to establish an exception to the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, requiring a warrant 
for the seizure of evidence, and to justify the Appellant's 
original stop and detention. Appellant and his co-defendant Mike 
Lovegren testified concerning the illegality of the stop, the lack 
of consent to search, and the circumstances surrounding the search. 
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The court took Appellant's motion under advisement and the parties 
submitted memoranda in support of their respective positions. 
On the 2 0th day of December, 1991, Judge Harding rendered a 
written Memorandum Decision denying Appellant's suppression motion. 
On May 27, 1992, a bench trial was held in Nephi, Utah. Following 
the trial, the court took the matter under advisement, then on 
July 9, 1992, issued another memorandum decision which found the 
co-defendant Lovegren not guilty and Appellant guilty as charged. 
Appellant was sentenced on October 22, 1992, and judgment was 
entered on the 10th day of December, 1992. Appellant filed his 
appeal from the judgment and conviction on December 15, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding, Fourth Judicial District Court for Juab County, State of 
Utah, entered on December 10, 1992. In this appeal, Appellant 
challenges the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress 
Evidence obtained as the result of the stop of his automobile as 
well as the court's ultimate verdict of guilty. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(All references cited herein are from the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing as numbered in the transcript of preliminary 
hearing.) 
On May 24th, 1993, Appellant and a co-defendant, Mike 
Lovegren, were travelling northbound on 1-15 in Juab County in the 
vicinity of Nephi, Utah, in Appellant's vehicle. Mr. Lovegren was 
driving the vehicle and the Appellant was sitting in the front 
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passenger seat. The parties had a radar detector in the vehicle 
and the radar detector was in working order. As the vehicle 
approached the Nephi area, Mr. Lovegren noticed a Utah State 
Highway Patrol vehicle in stationary in the median. He checked his 
speedometer and determined the vehicle was going 60 mph. As the 
defendants were proceeding past the highway patrol, their vehicle 
was passed by another vehicle which also passed two vehicles which 
were ahead of the defendants1 vehicle. Mr. Lovegren also passed 
the two slower vehicles and then noticed the highway patrol vehicle 
approaching defendants1 vehicle and saw the red light activated by 
the patrolman. The radar detector had not indicated the presence 
of radar and Mr. Lovegren had not exceeded the speed limit. (Sup. 
Hrg. p. 47-48) 
Trooper Paul Mangelson approached the vehicle and asked for 
driver's license and registration. Trooper Mangelson found the 
license and registration to be in order. The trooper testified 
that he smelled the smell of "burnt marijuana" as he talked with 
the occupants of the vehicle. He asked the defendants where they 
had been and where they were going. He then asked if they had any 
contraband in the vehicle, such as guns, drugs or alcohol. 
Appellant responded that they had a six-pack of beer in the trunk. 
The trooper asked again whether they had any drugs in the vehicle 
to which the Appellant responded "No." Trooper Mangelson then 
stated "Do you mind if I look through the vehicle?" Appellant 
asked, "Do you want to look in the trunk?" The trooper replied, 
"Yes, I would like to look in the trunk and also the interior." 
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The trooper testified that at that point, both defendants said, "Go 
ahead." (Sup. Hrg. p. 5-8) Appellant and co-defendant Lovegren 
both testified that Appellant said "No," at which time the trooper 
ordered the defendants to get out of the car and to stand by the 
front of the car. (Sup. Hrg. p. 43, 46, 49, 53) Trooper Mangelson 
then searched the interior of the vehicle finding the contraband. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant's vehicle was stopped as a result of a pretext 
traffic violation, that after the stop, he was illegally and 
unconstitutionally detained, and that no valid consent was given 
for the search of Appellant's vehicle. Further, the trial court 
did not address issues raised by Appellant and did not apply the 
proper standard of proof or legal analysis to the issue of consent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STOP OP THE APPELLANTS VEHICLE WAS A PRETEXT TO CONDUCT A 
SEARCH AND SAID SEARCH WAS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
A. The Standard of Review and Standard of Proof 
The standard of review for reviewing a factual finding by the 
trial court is the "clearly erroneous" standard. See State v. 
Thurmanr 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). However, a review of the 
Memorandum Decision of the Court (Addendum, Ex. ) indicates that 
the trial court did not treat the issue of the legality of the 
stop, although raised by Appellant in Appellant's memorandum. 
Since the trial court did not treat that issue, this Court should 
either remand this matter to the trial court to consider the issue 
or, based upon the record, determine the issue from the record, it 
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being the Appellant's position that where the court has not treated 
the issue in its decision, the clearly erroneous standard cannot 
apply. 
The appellate courts of this state have not specifically 
indicated which standard of proof the court must apply to weigh the 
evidence in a suppression hearing• This Court was asked to 
consider the issue in State v. Carter, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, but 
declined to do so since the facts in that case would have led to 
the same result under either the preponderance of the evidence 
standard urged by the State, or the clear and convincing standard 
urged by the Appellant. (Apparently the Carter decision was 
recalled for revision after being published in the advance reports 
and Appellant could not locate the revised opinion if it has been 
reissued at the time of filing the brief herein.) Appellant 
submits that in the present case there is an issue as to whether or 
not the decision of the lower court would have been different had 
the court used the preponderance of evidence standard as opposed to 
the clear and convincing evidence standard. This problem is 
presented in both the case of the determination of the clearly 
erroneous issues as well as the determination of the correction of 
error issues involved in reviewing the conclusions as to the 
voluntariness of a consent. 
There is no indication in the decision as to the standard of 
proof used by the court to weigh the evidence. Appellant suggests 
that the standard of proof which should be used to measure evidence 
at a suppression hearing should at least be that of the clear and 
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convincing level of proof. The court did not state that its 
determination of the consent issue was based upon a clear and 
convincing standard. Had the court used the clear and convincing 
evidence standard, Appellant suggests the court's determination 
would have been different. Without an indication by the court as 
to which standard was used, a reviewing court cannot determine 
whether or not the result would have been different with the 
appropriate standard of proof used as a measure. 
B. The Traffic Stop by the Trooper Was a Pretext Stop 
As set forth in the facts above, the trooper alleged that the 
reason for the initial stop of Appellant's vehicle was that the 
vehicle had exceeded the tolerance allowed by the trooper by one 
mile per hour, indicating that his radar reading obtained on the 
vehicle was 71 mph in a 65 mph zone. This raises a factual dispute 
in that Lovegren, the driver of the car, testified that shortly 
prior to being pulled over, he had observed the patrol car parked 
in the median and checked the speedometer, noting the speed to be 
60 mph, and that the radar detector had not gone off. He further 
stated that a car passed the Appellant's vehicle and then passed 
two other cars, at which time he also passed the two cars. After 
passing the two cars, he saw the patrol vehicle in his rear view 
mirror and again checked the speedometer which indicated 60 mph. 
Again, the radar detector had not indicated the use of radar. He 
indicated that although the officer indicated that the Appellant's 
car was travelling at the rate of 71 mph with the reading being 
obtained by his radar unit, and the trooper testified that the 
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radar unit had been locked to show the speed of Appellant's car, 
when Lovegren was transported by the trooper following the arrest, 
he saw the reading locked on the radar to be 77 mph. The lack of 
indication from the radar detector, which the parties testified had 
been functioning prior to the stop, and the different reading from 
the radar unit would indicate that the trooper had not obtained a 
radar reading from the vehicle, but was using that reason as an 
excuse to stop the Appellant to search for contraband. Appellant 
submits that this is not a case where the law enforcement officer 
had no purpose for engaging in the misconduct. The misconduct was 
carried out in order to obtain consent to search the Appellant's 
vehicle for drugs. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), 
holding that where the police conduct was engaged in as a pretext 
for collateral objectives, and suppressing the resulting evidence 
will have a greater likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in 
the future, then evidence should be suppressed. 
The state has the burden of proving that the trooper stopped 
the vehicle based upon reasonable suspicion that the occupants had 
committed or were about to commit a crime, or for a traffic 
violation that would normally justify a stop based upon the 
"reasonable officer11 standard. After-acquired probable cause 
cannot retroactively justify an illegal stop. [State v. Bairdf 763 
P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988)]. As set forth herein, both occupants 
denied that they were speeding, which position was bolstered by the 
evidence that the radar detector did not indicate the use of radar 
and that the reading on the radar gun was substantially higher than 
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that indicated by the trooper. That evidence would indicate a 
pretext stop. 
However, even should the Court determine that the trooper's 
version of the facts concerning the reason for the stop to be more 
credible, the test is whether "a hypothetical reasonable officer, 
in view of the totality of the circumstances confronting him or 
her, would have stopped [the Defendants] to issue a warning...The 
proper inquiry does not focus on whether the officer could have 
made the stop." State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, at 978 (Utah App. 
1988). See also State v. Arroyo, 102 Utah Ad. Rep. 1989). Using 
the totality of the circumstances test as required by United States 
v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, Appellant submits that the state 
has not met its burden to establish the factual basis for the stop 
to be a legitimate function of law enforcement other than to 
provide an opportunity for the trooper to search for drugs. 
Although this issue was raised by the Appellant in his 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, the court's written 
decision did not address the legality of the stop or analyze apply 
the above stated guidelines to the facts of this case. The 
decision denying Appellant's motion to suppress should be reversed. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING THE INITIAL STOP OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER, THE 
SUBSEQUENT AND EXTENDED DETENTION OP APPELLANT RESULTED IN A DE 
FACTO ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE 
A. Standard of Review 
The standard for review for a determination of whether or not 
the detention of the Appellant beyond the time necessary to 
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complete a traffic stop resulted in a de facto arrest without 
probable cause is that of the "correction of error" standard since 
its consideration involves a question of law. Although the 
Appellant raised the issue of unlawful extended detention in the 
lower court, the trial court did not address that issue at all. 
B. The Appellant Was Detained by the Trooper for a 
Constitutionally Unreasonable Time, Constituting an 
Illegal Arrest. 
Trooper Mangelson testified that once he stopped the 
Appellant's vehicle, he approached the vehicle and asked for the 
operator's drivers license which was produced. He then asked for 
the registration to the vehicle which was produced. He testified 
that there was nothing improper about either the registration or 
the driver's license and that as far as he knew, the vehicle was 
being operated legally. (Sup. Hrg. p.16-17) The trooper stated 
that when he first approached the vehicle he smelled what he 
recognized to be the smell of burnt marijuana coming from the 
vehicle. (Sup. Hrg. p. 17) He also stated that he smelled the 
strong smell of air fresheners coming from the vehicle, but the 
smell was not strong enough to mask the smell of the burnt 
marijuana. (Sup. Hrg. p. 19) He further stated that he observed no 
physical evidence of illicit drugs prior to the search of the 
vehicle. After obtaining the license and registration information 
and determining those documents to be in order, the trooper then 
asked the Appellant where they had been and received information 
from the occupants that they had been on a trip together to Las 
Vegas. (Sup. Hrg. p. 22) The trooper then asked if he could look 
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through the vehicle and received the responses from Appellant set 
forth above. The trooper then told them to get out of the vehicle 
and go to the front of the car. He then patted both individuals 
down for weapons and found no drugs or paraphernalia. (Sup. Hrg. 
p. 25-26) The trooper testified that he did not detect the odor of 
burnt marijuana coming from the persons of the Appellant and 
Lovegren when he had them outside the vehicle and that the longer 
he remained, the smell of marijuana was not as strong. (Sup. Hrg. 
p. 38) The trooper then began to search the vehicle during which 
search he discovered contraband. 
A police officer in Utah has been determined to be able to 
legally detain a motorist stopped for a routine traffic matter long 
enough to request a driver's license, vehicle registration, conduct 
a computer check, and issue a citation. State v. Lovegren, 829 
P.2d 155. However, any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose for 
the initial stop is justified only if the detaining officer has a 
reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity. See State v. 
Robinson, 797 P. 2d 431. Based upon the testimony of the trooper 
that all he had observed which may have given him cause to believe 
that the defendants were involved in some crime was the smell of 
burnt marijuana which was not about the persons of the occupants, 
and the smell of air fresheners, the only possible reasonable 
inference as to any crime which the parties may have committed 
would be that of possession of marijuana butts or residue. It is 
interesting to note that in his exhaustive search of the vehicle, 
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he did not find any residue, butts or other evidence that would 
verify his claim of smelling burnt marijuana. ( Sup. Hrg. p. 27-28) 
Possession of marijuana being a Class B misdemeanor, Appellant 
argues that that particular crime would not qualify as a "serious 
crime11 which would justify further detention. 
Under Terry v. Ohio, 3 92 U.S. 1, once a Fourth Amendment 
seizure has occurred, any detention for reasons exceeding the scope 
of the original stop and not reasonably related to the 
circumstances justifying the stop in the first place, is illegal. 
(392 U.S. at 19-20.) There is no question that the Appellant and 
Lovegren were detained beyond the time required to complete the 
traffic stop. There is also no question but that Trooper Mangelson 
would not have allowed the parties to leave at any time following 
the stop. The following responses of the trooper at the 
suppression hearing indicate his intention to detain the occupants 
of the vehicle to investigate further: 
Q. At that point, were they free to leave? 
A. No, I don't think so. 
Q. You had your red light on did you not? 
A. Well, it doesn't matter whether the red light was on or 
not. They were not free to leave I don't believe. I mean if 
they asked to leave, they would not have left. 
Q. They were detained by you? 
A. They were because of the smell. 
Q. So your arrest of them was because of the smell of the 
marijuana or your detention of them was because of the smell 
of marijuana is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And that is even though you hadnft found or seen any 
physical marijuana or you hadn't seen any physical evidence of 
anything else other than the smell of the marijuana? 
A. At that point? 
Q. Yes. 
A. The point where they asked me to look in the trunk? 
Q. Yes. 
A. You know at that point they just as well have said, that 
we have got contraband, we have got drugs because in essence 
they told me in their body language, their actions. 
Q. Their actions told you they were nervous about it? 
A. At that point, they were not free to go. 
Q. Okay, now at that point you had intended to detain them 
for further search? 
A. For the — 
Q. At the point you smelled marijuana? 
A. Yes, I asked, yes. 
Q. At that point, you intended to detain them for further 
search? 
A. That is why I asked. 
The foregoing indicates that without question, the officer 
considered the occupants to be detained although he had no 
objective evidence other than the smell of burnt marijuana was not 
evident on the persons of the occupants, and body language upon 
which to base probable cause to continue holding the Appellant. 
This is similar in that respect to the situation in State v. 
Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652, where during testimony at the 
suppression hearing, the deputy sheriff making a traffic stop on 
defendants indicated that the defendants were not free to leave at 
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any time during the stop. The court therefore found that the 
defendants were seized under the Fourth Amendment and that the 
consideration at that point must center upon whether or not the 
officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
justifying further detention of the defendants. In Godina-Luna, 
the officer also testified that the defendants appeared nervous and 
that they were travelling to the indicated destination in a less 
than direct route. The appellate court upheld the trial court's 
determination that the further detention and questioning concerning 
drugs and contraband was improper and that the consent given by the 
defendant was not voluntary under the circumstances. 
While there have been some cases which have held that the 
smell of burnt marijuana together with other factors may form the 
basis of probable cause to search, in the present case, the trial 
court issued its conclusions upon the validity of the consent and 
did not find the search to be justified by the smell of burnt 
marijuana. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT DID NOT GIVE CONSENT TO SEARCH HIS VEHICLE 
A. The Standard of Review 
The standard of review to be applied to review of a trial 
court's determination of factual issues is the "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Appellant submits that the evidence submitted to the 
court concerning the facts and circumstances of the stop and claim 
of consent by Trooper Mangelson clearly indicate that the trial 
court's determination that Appellant consented to the search is 
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clearly erroneous. 
B. The Appellant Did Not Give Consent to Search the Vehicle, 
There were three persons present at the time the consent of 
the Appellant to search his vehicle was allegedly obtained by 
Trooper Mangelson, the trooper, the Appellant, and Appellant's co-
defendant, Mike Lovegren. The testimony of all three of them at 
both the hearing on suppression of the evidence was consistent to 
a point. At the point in time that the trooper asked if he could 
look in the vehicle, all parties agreed that the passenger, the 
Appellant, replied with the question, "Do you want to look in the 
trunk?11 The trooper responded, "Yes, and also the interior of the 
vehicle." (Sup. Hrg. p. 8, 21, 42, 53) At that point, the testimony 
of the Appellant and Mike Lovegren, although consistent with each 
other, is at odds with the testimony of Trooper Mangelson. Both 
Appellant and Lovegren testified that neither of them consented to 
the search of the vehicle. In fact, Appellant testified, "Well, 
there was no way I was ever going to tell him 'yes1.11 (Sup. Hrg. 
p.43, 53) At the time the trooper made his request to search the 
vehicle, the trooper stated that the Appellant and Lovegren 
appeared "apprehensive." (Sup. Hrg. p. 8, 22) 
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Florida v. 
Rover, 460 U.S. 491, at 497, stated: 
Where the validity of a search rests on consent, the state has 
the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained 
and it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not 
satisfied by showing by mere submission to a claim of lawful 
authority. See also State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Ut. App. 
1988) . 
Voluntary consent is that which was in fact voluntarily given, and 
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not the result of duress or coercion, expressed or implied. State 
v. Arroyo, 102 Ut. Adv. Rep. 34 (Ut. App. 1989) and Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The Supreme Court in the 
foregoing case stated: 
The issue of whether a person's consent to search is voluntary 
is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of 
all circumstances. 412 U.S. at 219. 
The issue of consent then contains two basic considerations. 
First, whether or not express consent was given as claimed by the 
trooper. Second, whether or not, if given, said expressed consent 
was voluntary or was a result of duress or coercion, which may be 
express or implied. 
At to the first consideration, Appellant submits that there 
was no consent given and the facts of the case support this 
position. Appellant submits that the evidence before the trial 
court of the circumstances surrounding the alleged consent support 
the testimony of the Appellant that such did not occur. Appellant, 
when first asked if he could look in the vehicle, did not say 
"Sure, go ahead.11 He specifically limited his response to "Do you 
want to look in the trunk?" Appellant knew there were no drugs in 
the trunk, but also knew that there was contraband in the interior 
of the car. When the trooper indicated that he wanted to search 
the interior as well, then the Appellant responded "No." Although 
Trooper Mangelson testified that his inquiry was directed at 
Appellant, he maintained that both driver and passenger responded 
to his question with "Go ahead." This is not consistent with the 
fact that the trooper was having the conversation with Appellant as 
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the owner of the vehicle. This version is also not consistent with 
the observation of the trooper that the occupants appeared 
apprehensive when asked for consent to search. The testimony 
smacks of being tailored to avoid suppression by the court in the 
event that either of the occupants attempted to do so by involving 
them both in the consent. Upon Appellant's refusal to give consent 
to search, the trooper ordered the occupants out of the vehicle and 
told them to stand to the front then searched the interior of the 
vehicle where he found the evidence. 
Although the court in the memorandum decision dated 
December 20, 1991, found that the Appellant and Lovegren had given 
consent, Appellant submits that finding is not supported by any 
evidence other than the inconsistent statement of the trooper. 
POINT IV 
THE CONSENT, IF GIVEN, BY APPELLANT WAS NOT GIVEN VOLUNTARILY 
A. The Standard of Review 
The standard for review of the issue of the voluntariness of 
consent has been determined by the Utah State Supreme Court to be 
that of the correction of error standard. See State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, at 1262 (Utah 1993). 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Its Determination That the 
Consent of the Appellant to Search the Vehicle Was 
Voluntary. 
The decision of the trial court that the consent of the 
Appellant, if given, was given freely and voluntarily, is erroneous 
under the facts presented at the suppression hearing. This issue 
requires the court to determine this issue by applying the 
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"totality of all the circumstances11 consideration. The attitude of 
the trooper is telling. Trooper Mangelson admitted that although 
he has access in his patrol car written consent forms which would 
clearly establish the consent of Appellant, that he doesn't use 
them because they are too hard to get into court. He also 
testified that whether the Appellant consented to the search or not 
did not matter because he was going to search anyway, and that the 
consent was merely a formality. The trooper responded during cross 
examination at the suppression hearing as follows: 
Q. Now you recall that it had been Mr. Delaney that had been 
conversing with you about the trunk and about the alcohol and 
so forth, but it is your recollection that both these 
individuals said, "Go ahead"? 
A. They both did, yes. 
Q. You are positive they didn't say, "No"? 
A. I am positive. 
Q. Had it not have made any difference to you? 
A. It really wouldn't have done, no. 
Q. You had determined to search anyway, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So actually obtaining consent was a formality as far as 
you were concerned? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any written consent forms that you have 
available for your use? 
A. We do. 
Q. Do you carry those around with you in your patrol car? 
A. I do. 
Q. Do you use those? 
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A. I have used about two of them in the past last three or 
four years. 
Q. Why didn't you use that consent form at this time? 
A. Why didn't I? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I just didn't think it was necessary. 
Q. Was that because you had already determined you were going 
to search, whether they gave their consent? 
A. Probably. Yes, that could have a bearing on it. 
Q. If you had a concern about whether or not you had probable 
cause to search or whether or not you should conduct a search 
at that point, you may have used the form I take it? 
A. May have done. My experience has been with obtaining a 
consent is that once you start using that, things start 
getting more complicated than with going without. 
Q. In other words, the defendants may refuse the search? 
A. Well, not only that, it is harder to get a consent to 
search into court, a signed consent, than it is a verbal 
consent. That has been my experience. 
The above-quoted portion of testimony supports the Appellant's 
contention that the trooper was not concerned with consent, and was 
obviously not concerned about whether or not the Appellant knew he 
had a right to refuse because it made no difference to the trooper. 
This attitude is one of the end justifying the means. A reasonable 
conclusion is that the trooper was going to search and then justify 
the search later. 
In the case of State v. Harmon, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, this 
Court stated the following in regard to the matters to be 
considered in determining whether a consent to search is voluntary: 
In order for consent to be voluntary, (1) there must be clear 
and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal, 
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specific, and freely and intelligently given; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without duress or 
coercion, express or implied; and (3) the courts must indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence 
that such rights were waived. 215 Utah Ad. Rep. at 41. 
The court in the Harmon case found that the search of the 
defendant's home was freely and voluntarily given where the 
defendant was not claiming that she did not give consent, but that 
her consent was coerced. In that case, the defendant signed a 
written consent form which the court found to have adeguately 
warned her of her right to refuse the search. In the present case, 
although the trooper testified that he had written consent forms in 
his possession in his patrol vehicle, he chose not to use them 
because defendants may not consent as readily or the courts may not 
be as willing to admit the evidence. The last conclusion of the 
trooper appears to be questionable, but the reasonable conclusion 
to be drawn from the testimony of the trooper is that he was 
concerned that if he used the forms, the parties would refuse. 
There is no evidence that he advised Appellant of any right to 
refuse because regardless of the response from Appellant, he was 
going to search. Although the courts have not held that the 
failure to make a defendant aware of the right to refuse does not 
necessarily invalidate a consent, it has been determined to be one 
of the factors to consider. 
The trial court did not make a finding concerning any another 
basis for the search other than consent and the court did not make 
any indication that the court applied the "totality of the 
circumstances" consideration in or the analysis set out in the 
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Harmon decision requiring consideration of the three requirements 
set forth therein. Therefore, Appellant argues that the decision 
of the court in regard to voluntariness of consent should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court in ruling that the Appellant's 
Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his 
vehicle should be reversed in that the trial court did not consider 
and rule upon all of the issues presented by Appellant, and did not 
indicate what standard of proof was applied by the court in 
reaching the evidentiary findings. Further, the trial court's 
determination of the factual issue of whether or not the Appellant 
gave consent was clearly erroneous in light of the weight of the 
evidence. Additionally, the trial court did not apply the proper 
analysis to the issue of the voluntariness of the consent alleged 
to have been given by Appellant and made no findings or indication 
in the decision to indicate that the totality of the circumstances 
was considered in arriving at the decision of the court. The 
decision concerning voluntariness represents an error of law and 
should be corrected by this Court consistent with the facts of the 
case. Appellant's Motion to Suppress should have been granted and 
his conviction should be reversed. 
Dated this 12th day of July, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(f) 
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Amend. I UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
CHARLES COTESWORTH 
PlNCKNEY, 
CHARLES PINCKNEY, 
PIERCE BUTLER. 
Georgia WILLIAM FEW, 
ABR BALDWIN. 
In Convention Monday September 17th 1787. 
Present The States of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. 
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved, 
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the 
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is 
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should after-
wards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, 
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the 
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent 
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting 
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof 
to the United States in Congress assembled. 
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, 
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall 
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in 
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Elec-
tors should be appointed by the States which shall 
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Elec-
tors should assemble to vote for the President, and 
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings un-
der this Constitution. That after such Publication the 
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and 
Representatives elected: That the Electors should 
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the Presi-
dent, and should transmit their Votes certified, 
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution re-
quires, to the Secretary of the United States in Con-
gress assembled, that the Senators and Representa-
tives should convene at the Time and Place assigned; 
that the Senators should appoint a President of the 
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and 
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he 
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the Pres-
ident, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this 
Constitution. 
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention. 
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X I BILL OF RIGHTS! 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII 
AMENDMENT I 
(Religious and political freedom.! 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to b e a r arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessarv to it,.. ... 
curity of a free State, the right of the people i.. \<t.... 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. ! 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.1 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed bv law 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.! 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.! 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases . | 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by-
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
IBail — Punishment.l 
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stances listed in Schedules II through V ex-
cept that he may possess such controlled sub-
stances when they are prescribed to him by a 
licensed practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance with intent to distribute, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or 
II is guilty of a second degree felony and 
upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III 
or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third de-
gree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection 
is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third de-
gree felony. 
2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to possess or use a controlled sub-
stance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practi-
tioner while acting in the course of his pro-
fessional practice, or as otherwise authorized 
by this subsection; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or per-
son in control of any building, room, tene-
ment, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them 
to be occupied by persons unlawfully possess-
ing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to be present where controlled sub-
stances are being used or possessed in viola-
tion of this chapter and the use or possession 
is open, obvious, apparent, and not concealed 
from those present; however, a person may 
not be convicted under this subsection if the 
evidence shows that he did not use the sub-
stance himself or advise, encourage, or assist 
anyone else to do so; any incidence of prior 
unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this de-
fense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to possess an altered or forged pre-
scription or written order for a controlled 
substance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowingly and intentionally to pre-
scribe, administer, or dispense a controlled 
substance to a juvenile, without first obtain-
ing the consent required in Section 78-14-5 
of a parent, guardian, or person standing in 
loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases 
of an emergency; for purposes of this subsec-
tion, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in 
Section 78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any 
physical condition requiring the administra-
tion of a controlled substance for immediate 
relief of pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowingly and intentionally to pre-
scribe or administer dosages of a controlled 
PROFESSIONS 58-37-8 
substance in excess of medically recognized 
quantities necessary to treat the ailment, 
malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, adminis-
ter, or dispense any controlled substance to 
another person knowing that the other per-
son is using a false name, address, or other 
personal information for the purpose of se-
curing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds 
or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or 
II, or marijuana, if the amount is more than 
16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty 
of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in 
the form of an extracted resin from any part 
of the plant, and the amount is more than 
one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries 
of property occupied by any correctional facility 
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or 
other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a 
penalty one degree greater than provided in Sub-
section (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
possession of any controlled substance by a per-
son previously convicted under Subsection (2)(b), 
that person shall be sentenced to a one degree 
greater penalty than provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled sub-
stances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), 
or (iii), including less than one ounce of mari-
juana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a 
second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the per-
son is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon 
a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tions (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distrib-
ute or dispense a controlled substance in vio-
lation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense a controlled substance to 
another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a 
symbol required by this chapter or by a rule 
issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or fur-
nish any record, notification, order form, 
statement, invoice, or information required 
under this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for 
inspection as authorized by this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty of 
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<c» appeals from the juvenile courts; 
id) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony: 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cus-
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1992 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 
any of its functions in any location within the state. 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 
78-3-3. 
78-3-4. 
78-3-5. 
78-3-6. 
78-3-7 to 
78-3-11.5. 
78-3-12. 
78-3-12.5. 
78-3-13. 
78-3-13.4. 
78-3-13.5, 
78-3-14.5. 
78-3-15 to 
78-3-2. Repealed. 
Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when court does not exist. 
Repealed. 
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-11. Repealed. 
State District Court Administrative 
System. 
Repealed. 
Costs of system. 
Repealed. 
Counties joining court system — Pro-
cedure — Facilities — Salaries. 
78-3-14. Repealed. 
Allocation of district court fees and 
fines. 
78-3-17. Repealed. 
Section 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to 
counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Re-
sponsibilities — Reports. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment — Qualifications — Sal-
ary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, du-
ties, and responsibilities. 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the 
courts — Appointment of trial court 
executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provide information and sta-
tistical data to administrator of the 
courts. 
78-3-27. Annual judicial conference. 
78-3-28. Repealed. 
78-3-29. Presiding judge — Election — Term 
— Compensation — Powers — Du-
ties. 
78-3-30. Duties of the clerk of the district 
court. 
78-3-31. Court commissioners — Qualifications 
— Appointment — Functions gov-
erned by rule. 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 1971, 1981, 1988 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed ini-
tially until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appoint-
ment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the 
district courts is six years, and commences on the 
first Monday in January, next following the date of 
election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. 1988 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when court does not exist. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraor-
dinary writs and other writs necessary to carry into 
effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council and subject to policies 
established by the Judicial Council, cases filed in the 
district court, which are also within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be transferred to 
the circuit court by the presiding judge of the district 
court in multiple judge districts or the district court 
judge in single judge districts. The transfer of these 
cases may be made upon the court's own motion or 
upon the motion of either party for adjudication. 
When an order is made transferring a case, the court 
shall transmit the pleadings and papers to the circuit 
court to which the case is transferred. The circuit 
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been 
originally commenced in the circuit court and any 
